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29 June 1964

Briefly Noted

Chicoms Condemn Yugoslav "Capitalism"

A recent release by the New China News Agency (NCNA) summarized a Red Flag article which charged that Yugoslavia's economy has "degenerated into a capitalist economy" and assailed "Khrushchev and his followers for stubbornly asserting" that the Yugoslav economy is socialist. Red Flag presented "facts" to prove that the relationship between "the Tito group" and Yugoslav workers is that of "exploiter and exploited - ruler and ruled." By endorsing Yugoslav policies, Red Flag stated, the Soviet leaders are introducing in the USSR the "grave danger of the restoration of capitalism."

Yugoslavia is still a Communist state, although the Chinese are correct in saying that the Yugoslav economy has shifted in a number of ways from Lenin-Stalin doctrine. The Yugoslav economy has many unorthodox features, such as workers councils and open markets, and state controls are more intelligently used. The most significant feature is the Yugoslav government's effort to let the market -- not administrative rulings alone -- play a role in deciding how resources should be allocated. What the Chinese do not mention is that Yugoslav economic well-being, both national and per capita, has risen steadily and in direct proportion to the regime's lessening of executive force as an instrument to shape the economy.

While the base from which the Yugoslav economy started was low and percentage growth therefore high, the improvement is nonetheless noteworthy. The Yugoslavs' 1963 "Social Plan" called for an increase in the "Social Product" (equivalent to Gross National Product) of 9.3% over 1962. The increase achieved was 12%. The 1963 living standard went up sharply in such terms as Real Personal Income (up 7.6% over 1962 instead of the planned 4.5%) and Personal Consumption (up 7 - 8% over 1962 instead of the planned 4 - 5%). The 1964 Social Plan calls for continuing increases in each of these categories over the 1962 Plan, and there is every indication that the goals will be met, as the Yugoslav Social Plans tend more and more to be built up from below rather than dictated by executive fiat from above.

To non-Communist audiences we air this evidence of the CCP doggedly demanding the imposition of economic authoritarianism along with political dictatorship in other countries in spite of the superiority demonstrated by even a part of the free enterprise system, the free market, wherever the latter has been allowed to compete with doctrinaire Marxist economic methods. We point out that this amounts to a clear negation of the interests of the masses.

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A Case of Communist Perfidy.

Heinz Brandt, editor of the West German metal workers' trade union paper, flew to West Berlin in June 1961 to cover a congress for his paper but vanished. A week later the East German news agency ADN announced that he had been arrested as a Western agent. Following a secret trial by the East German Supreme Court, a 13-year prison sentence was announced on May 10, 1962.

Brandt was a veteran Communist who spent 11 years in Nazi concentration camps. After 1945, he worked in the CP propaganda department in East Berlin. He was purged for "deviationism" in 1954. In 1958, the Brandt family, including three small children, fled to West Germany because of the impending danger of arrest for political reasons. His abduction from West Berlin in 1961 set off a continuing chain of protests by international organizations and leading Western figures.

Brandt was released and permitted to return to West Germany on 23 May 1964. Shedding some light on the kidnapping, he reported that on 16 June 1961 he had a meeting with a West Berlin woman who had been introduced to him earlier by Beyerlein, a West German metal workers' union functionary. Shortly before leaving the woman's home, she offered Brandt a drink which contained a drug. Brandt collapsed in the street but remembers that 4 men came up to him, stating: "We have been waiting for you." Brandt came to in a building of the East German State Security Service.

In a letter dated 14 May 1964, postmarked in Vienna on 13 May, i.e. prior to any news about Brandt's impending release, Beyerlein informed his union that he was terminating his employment effective June 30 and would explain his action in "due course." In the meantime, legal proceedings have been instituted against Beyerlein for alleged assistance in the kidnapping. Beyerlein's whereabouts are unknown at this writing.

According to the union, Beyerlein became a Nazi Party member in 1925, was thrown out of the Party in 1930 but sought desperately to be re-admitted. He entered the Communist Party in 1945 and remained a member until 1955. Since September 1957 he had been in the employ of the metal workers' union in a training capacity, and had worked in another union since 1950. His earlier CP membership was known to the metal workers' union.

Brandt reported some details about his imprisonment and trial. He had been assured his release if he were willing to declare that he came to East Germany voluntarily, would induce his family to follow him, and renounce publicly his political activities in the West. Brandt had given Beyerlein some documents for safekeeping before a vacation trip, the contents of which were used against him in the trial.

The Brandt case demonstrates again that a persistent, unusual volume of protests -- in this case German and international, e.g. ICFTU, ILO, Red Cross, many leading international figures, including Bertrand Russell who returned the East German WPC affiliates' medal because of Brandt's imprisonment, etc. -- against Communist illegality and inhumanity can cause embarrassment to Communist regimes and force painful decisions on them. But the Brandt affair is also a vivid illustration of Communist tactics of subversion and violence and should be used as a reminder that peaceful co-existence policies notwithstanding, Communist goals and tactics do not change fundamentally.

Impartial Answer to Panama Charges. The International Commission of Jurists' committee of three -- from the Netherlands, Sweden and India -- investigated charges by the National Bar Association of Panama that the United States had violated the Human Rights Declaration in the rioting which was set off last January over flying the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. The Jurists, an unofficial organization of judges, lawyers and professors of law in most of the non-Communist countries (recognized by the United Nations and with its seat in Geneva) absolved the United States of any such violation and found the Government of Panama negligent in its handling of the riots which were inflamed and extended by organized Communist activity.

The jurists noted that this was "one of the first occasions" on which key provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were "invoked and construed authoritatively." They suggested that this may be "a major contribution" to the evolution of a workable international jurisprudence. Certainly it is a precedent for future opportunities to make use of such an organization in peaceful, juridical solutions to similar emotional conflicts with potentially ugly international consequences.

The Commission of Jurists report, in English, French or in Spanish, is attached herewith for those stations which we believe have facilities for using them. [If we have erroneously assumed you do not wish a copy, we will supply you with one or more immediately upon request -- in whichever of the three languages you wish.] The report has been exceptionally well received as an impartial, objective investigation and analysis. You may use this report as background for feature articles and for briefing political and liaison contacts.

**DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST**

13 July Pope Pius XII excommunicates all defending Communist anti-Christian doctrines; bars from sacraments those reading CP doctrine. 1949.

17 July Second OAU Heads of State Meeting, Cairo, 17-20 July.

19 July Laos becomes independent by treaty with France, 1949.

23 July Geneva Agreements guaranteeing Laos' independence and neutrality. 1962.

27 July French Thermidor 170th anniversary. Robespierre overthrown, guillotined following day. 1794.

31 July 30,444 refugees register during July at West Berlin receiving center (highest total since March 1953). 1961.

31 July Agreement reached for Federation of Malaysia. 1962.

August Symposium of "Peking Center" of World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) in Peking.

6 Aug 10th World Congress Against A and H Bombs, Tokyo.

8 Aug USSR declares war on Japan (breaking non-aggression pact 13 April 1941); occupies Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, Kuriles, and (10 August) North Korea. 1945.

13 Aug Third anniversary of The Wall, sealing East-West Berlin border.

16 Aug Cyprus becomes fully independent (under agreement signed 19 February 1959 ending 4-year conflict). 1960.

17 Aug Alliance for Progress Charter signed by US and 19 L.A. countries (all except Cuba), Punta del Este. 1961.

September International Union of Students (IUS) Congress, Nigeria, early September.

September World Youth Forum, Moscow, September.

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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#31

6-19 June 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments:

1. Soviet leaders and media continued to denounce the Chinese and push for an early international conference, supported by the Polish Party Congress (June 15-20) as Polish boss Gomulka came out strongly for such a conference with proper preparation but without allowing a few parties to delay it unreasonably. However, the important Rumanians, Yugoslavs and Italians refused to yield.
2. The Rumanian rebellion against Soviet domination led to at least three polemical attacks on Soviet policies during this period -- one broadcast and two published. The broadcast did not identify the Soviets; the first article used the East Germans as whipping boys; but the major 12,000-word article on June 13 named Soviets in specific charges. (See Chrono, June 5 and continuing.)
3. Yugoslav President Tito stopped in Leningrad on his return from a state visit to Finland for a hurried conference with Khrushchev on the 9th -- and then met suddenly with Rumanian President Gheorghiu-Dej on the 22nd. Public communiques after the first stressed the need for unity -- with the Yugoslav version emphasizing it more strongly than the Soviet -- and after the second mentioned only cordial atmosphere and spirit of mutual trust. However, reports from the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade -- including that of a 2-hour conversation by Ambassador Elbrick with Tito on the 18th -- indicate that the two Tito visits were related and that the latter was intended to warn Rumania against the dangers of going too far in its anti-Soviet polemics. Tito also reiterated his opposition to an international conference to Ambassador Elbrick and said flatly that there would be no such meeting for the time being.
4. Worthy of particular note among the polemics on the Soviet side is a 2,000-word article by a Costa Rican Communist leader (June issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism reprinted in Izvestiya on the 18th) giving an inside account of a meeting of a number of Latin American Communists with Mao Tse-tung in 1959. Mao is depicted as an irreconcilable brinksman who "likes international tension," scornful of the efforts of "our parties" to get China admitted to the U.N.
5. We have seen no direct Chinese attacks on the Soviets since the May 30 Government statement blasting Soviet Afro-Asian pretensions, though they publicized some anti-revisionist comments by others on the 22th, after the end of this period.

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the Chinese delegate to the Communist-organized Asian Economic Seminar in Pyongyang warned the Asian and African countries about the "great-power, chauvinistic and national-egotist manner" of the aid programs of the "modern revisionists." The Chinese also responded to the Czech charge of distributing letters interfering in Czech internal affairs, saying that the letters were obvious forgeries and the Czechs, by their conduct, have acted as collaborators of the forgers.

6. The Indonesian CP seemed to move farther into the Chinese camp, judging by reports on speeches by Aidit and Njoto and a joint communique on unity of views with the New Zealand CP which has been one of the most forthright Peking supporters. The Njoto speech contains probably the strongest anti-Soviet (though the Soviets are not named) attacks yet heard from the PKI, and Aidit charges the "modern revisionists" with splitting activities in Indonesia. North Vietnam reiterated its anti-revisionist line, and the Albanians lashed out with two more vituperous attacks, one of them a massive ode to Stalin combined with a denunciation of Khrushchev, running to almost 30,000 words.

Significance:

This period has seen further evidence of Soviet efforts to promote a world Communist conference, with one concrete gain in the tender of strong support by Poland's Gomulka, unanimously confirmed in his leadership by his Party's congress. However, the "hard-core" and vitally important hold-outs -- the Rumanians, Yugoslavs, and Italians -- seemed to grow ever more determined in their resistance, and Tito stated flatly that such a conference will not be held at this time. Obviously, prospects for a conference have grown no less confused.

On the other side, at least two important Asian parties which had tried to maintain neutrality -- the Indonesians and the North Vietnamese -- seem to be closing ranks more solidly with the Chinese.

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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#31

6-19 June 1964

May (delayed): The lead article of the Bulgarian Party's monthly theoretical journal Novo Vreme, devoted to the unity of the WCM and the Chinese CP, reveals serious concern with the danger of Chinese influence and propaganda; it states that Chinese propaganda material in Bulgarian is sent to Bulgaria from the U.S.A.

May 2 (delayed): No. 15 of the Amsterdam bi-weekly De Brug, organ of the Dutch Socialist Workers' Party (dissident Communist), carries a 3-column article on the newly-appearing anonymous Dutch pro-Chinese dissident Communist publication De Rode Vlag (see Chrono #28, April 20 for first reports). De Brug describes the new publications as "a sloppily stenciled sheet" which is "published by representatives of Chinese Communist views in the CPN." It admits the possibility that De Rode Vlag could be published by the Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Internal Security Service) to increase confusion in the CPN, but "as long as there is no proof, we hold to the opinion that it is the Chinese."

June 5 and continuing: A series of further "independence" moves by the Rumanians include: (1) a June 5 article in the leading Rumanian economic journal Viata Economica by Chief Editor Murgescu attacking a "recent" article by East German economist Willi Kunx under auspices GDR Academy of Sciences on "Basic Problems of International Economic Collaboration between CEMA Members," reiterating the familiar Rumanian arguments against economic superstates; (2) a Radio Bucharest domestic broadcast on the 5th which directly rebutted and denounced a May 30 Radio Moscow Rumanian-language broadcast entitled "Let Us Strengthen the Socialist Community" -- although RM was identified only as "a foreign radio station"; (3) a major attack (12,000 words) in the June 13 issue of Viata Economica against Soviet economists (identified by name) for proposing to establish Lower Danube "interstate economic complexes" which would mean "violation of the territorial integrity of Rumania, dismemberment of its unity as a nation and state" (the Soviet article referred to is published alongside this rebuttal -- Chinese style); and Rumanian press announcement on the 18th of a June 16 amnesty for 2,500 political prisoners, with additional amnesties in preparation so that by August 23 (date set for celebration 20th anniversary of Rumania's liberation from Fascist occupation) "there will be practically no more political prisoners in Rumania."

June 6 and continuing: Soviet media continue to publicize endorsements of the CPSU position and call for world conference though not adding any new names to those listed by the June Kommunist and Problems of Peace and Socialism (Chrono #30, June 3 & 4).

June 6 (& 14): At the conclusion of a 4-day visit to Indonesia by New Zealand CP GenSecy Wilcox (see also Chrono #30, June 4), PKI Chairman Aidit and Wilcox signed a joint communique affirming "Similar views on all international questions discussed, including the problems that have arisen recently in the ICM." They "reaffirm their united opinion" that modern revisionism is the main danger in the ICM, and "it is therefore obligatory for every M-L party continuously to intensify the struggle

to expose modern revisionism...." They are of the opinion that "it is necessary for the CPSU and the CCP to resume negotiations....preceded by adequate preparations and held at a time convenient to both....It is also the joint opinion of the two parties that bilateral talks on an equal basis should be held between the CPSU and the Albanian Workers Party. The two parties agree that an international meeting...should be held after proper preparations.... It is impermissible for this meeting to be forcibly or hastily convened...." Peking Peoples' Daily publishes full text -- and other Chinese papers excerpts -- on the 14th.

June 8: No. 11 of the Chinese CP theoretical journal Red Flag features a major article "Yugoslav Agriculture Is Going Down the Road of Capitalism" by Shih Tung-hsiang, following another article by the same writer in the previous issue on "the degenerate state of the Yugoslav economy." The Chinese Peoples Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries issues a statement denouncing the "unwarranted attack" and "fantastic calumnies" hurled at the CCP and the Chinese Government by an article in the Czech Party daily Rude Pravo of 24 May and a speech by Czech First Secretary Novotny on 28 May. The Czechs "slandered China as having 'distributed slanderous and provocative letters to incite opposition to the leadership of other Communist parties,'" etc. (See Chrono, May 25). But, Peking says, "the two letters ... are forgeries, pure and simple. They are so crudely forged and the holes in them are so glaring that the forgery can be detected at a glance." The statement describes clues which demonstrate the forgeries, and adds that "if Rude Pravo and the Czechoslovak leader had the least political seriousness, the matter could have been easily clarified," -- also that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had done so "on 13 May 1964, when the Czech Ambassador to China made a groundless charge and lodged a protest against China in connection with the first forged letter." By their actions, concludes the statement, the Czechs "have placed themselves in the position of collaborators of those who forged the letters."

Yugoslav President Tito, returning from a state visit to Finland, stopped a day in Leningrad for "a friendly, unofficial visit at the invitation" of Khrushchev. The communique published in Pravda on the 9th says that they "discussed topical problems of the international Communist and workers movement. Stressing the importance of the cohesion of all the progressive forces struggling for peace, democracy, and socialism, they emphasized the necessity for each Communist and workers party to make its contribution toward overcoming the difficulties which have emerged in the WCM and to achieve the unity and cohesion...." NY Times correspondent Binder reports from Belgrade that the Serbian version of the communique uses the words "imperative need" in place of "necessity" and added "monolithic" before "unity," but there has been no comment on the difference. A Pravda editorial on the 18th emphasizes that the identity of views has been confirmed by Yugoslav press comment on the meeting.

June 9: The Rumanian delegation to Moscow headed by Chivu Stoica (see also Chrono, May 26) returned home after talks with Mikoyan, Podgorny and Andropov. "During the talk which passed in a spirit of friendship and

mutual understanding an exchange of opinion on questions of interest to both parties took place." (Tass)

June 9-10 and 11-12: The Indonesian Party daily Harian Rakjat carries in two installments on 9-10 a major speech by Second Vice Chairman Njoto at the Aliarcham Political Academy on 3 June on the subject: "To Strive for the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution With the Weapon of Dialectical and Historical Materialism." He denounces the pragmatism of the modern revisionists who "have gone so far as to abolish the revolutionary spirit of Marxist theory and even cast away Marxist theory itself....From here we can easily see through the hypocritical faces of the renegades of Marxism."

The revisionists are pedantic and very arrogant. They regard themselves as great theoreticians, take themselves as correct, look down upon the opinions of others, and are afraid of being criticized. They lose their temper very easily. They look at the world from an ivory tower -- perhaps the ivory tower of the workers movement!....In their opinion, the area of Asia, Africa and Latin America is a "backward area" without any contribution to world civilization. ...They do not educate the masses to have self-confidence; what they are doing is teaching people to depend on others. ...In the face of "the weak" they put on airs, like wolves before the sheep, but in the face of the imperialists, they act like sheep before the wolves.

Starting from their philosophy of pragmatism, their measure of what is right and wrong is whether it is useful for them or not....

...We may use the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Aidit, in the Indonesian version....The well-known writer Anna Louise Strong, to whom Bung Karno has paid high tribute, told me last year that according to her view there are at present in the world three revolutionary leaders whose language is the language of the people: they are Mao Tse-tung, Castro, and Aidit. ..

On 11-12 Harian Rakjat prints, again in two installments, a detailed summary of a long speech by Chairman Aidit at a reception in Surabaya on 23 May in celebration of the Party's 44th anniversary. He is quoted as saying:

It is not only necessary for us to carry on the ideological struggle (to defend M-L and oppose modern revisionism) internationally but also to do the same within our country. This is because of late the modern revisionists have been very active in splitting the Indonesian working class movement. They are fostering degenerate elements and elements which have been bought off....

June 10: An Izvestiya article by Nikolay Polyanov assails the Peking leaders as now "in the same company with the 'wild men,' the reactionaries and hidebound colonialists." An editorial in Czech Party daily Rude Pravo attacks the CCP along the same lines.

June 11: The Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit features a 2,000-word editorial: "Khrushchev's Revisionists Favor the Isolation of the Afro-Asian Peoples."

June 12: In a long speech before 6,000 at a Soviet-German friendship meeting in connection with Ulbricht's visit, Khrushchev lashed out repeatedly at the adventurist policies of the Chinese. Tass that "a Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by Anastas Mikoyan will visit Indonesia in the second half of this month," reciprocating an Indonesian visit to the USSR last September.

The Albanian Zeri I Popullit features a massive (almost 30,000 words) article: "The Dangerous Maneuvers of the Nikita Khrushchev Group in Connection with the So-called Struggle Against the Personality Cult Must Be Unmasked to the Very End." After a brief introduction saying "...we aim to discover the... hidden objectives...(of) the treacherous Khrushchev group...(in their) so-called 'struggle against the personality cult'" the Albanians state that Stalin "came out firmly more than once against the idolization of any person."

"And if his actions as a leader showed -- as the revisionists pretend -- signs of the personality cult, a great part of the responsibility for this belongs to such people as Khrushchev and Mikoyan, who knew of it but did not criticize it; on the contrary, they sang hymns of praise to Stalin, calling him 'The father, the wise master, the genial leader of the party, the Soviet people, and the workers of the entire world.' Khrushchev called him 'the genius of socialism, the genial architect....' Mikoyan described him as 'the coryphee of science, the genius of humanity.' Thus spoke Khrushchev and his companions when Stalin was alive, which goes to show that they were hypocrites and secret traitors...."

The noise about the "personality cult" serves as a smokescreen, justifying, masking, and spreading in the ICM the anti-Marxist, opportunist and treasonable line of the group....

Second, in order to silence the M-L parties which defend J.V. Stalin's revolutionary work and oppose the... treasonable activities of N. Khrushchev and his followers, in order to discredit these parties and smooth the obstacles on the revisionist path, Khrushchev puts forward the "personality cult" like a black sheep....

A short second section is headed: "The Aim of the Revisionists Is To Liquidate the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." Then follows a meaty section headed "The Accusations of N. Khrushchev Concerning the Alleged 'Crimes' of Stalin Give Rise to Legitimate Doubts -- They Are False," starting, for example:

The hypocritical and perfidious face of Khrushchev is also clearly shown in another affair. The decision of the July 1953 plenum relating to the Beriya affair notes that "recently, the criminal plans of Beriya were

discovered to set up, through his clique, personal links with Tito and Rankovic in Yugoslavia." This at the time constituted one of the most serious accusations against Beriya. But what should one call the present fact that N. Khrushchev has not only established "personal links" with Tito and Rankovic, but that he has also associated himself with them....? Beriya had only made plans, but Khrushchev has fulfilled these plans.

The next section is headed: "Under the Pretext of the 'Struggle Against the Personality Cult' the Revisionist Have Opened the Doors for the Penetration of the Bourgeois Ideology." Here among other charges, the Albanians complain that "They have forgotten revolutionary traditions, the historic optimism of Soviet literature, and have started printing in great editions of 50,000 to 100,000 copies decadent works, slanderous and degrading works such as the novel 'One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,' which in essence denies the Soviet regime itself."

The next section, "The Anti-Stalinist Course of the Khrushchevite Revisionists and the Course of Capitalist Degeneration of the Socialist Economy," blasts Khrushchev's claims of achievement, pointing out that the foundations for recent Soviet scientific and technical feats were laid -- and "atomic energy was for the first time used for peaceful aims" -- in Stalin's time.

June 14: The Czech Communist youth daily Mlada Fronta condemns the splitting activities of the leaders of CPR youth organizations. "It is the fault of the Chinese youth leaders that contacts have practically ceased between the Chinese Youth League and the Czechoslovak Youth League and youth organizations of the other socialist countries."

Under the heading "The Pilgrimage of a Renegade," Izvestiya complains about the high-level Chinese attention (received by Mao) to "the leader of the Belgian splitters, Grippa," who was "exposed and thrown out in disgrace from the Belgian Communist Party." Grippa's visit is fresh confirmation of the fact, Izvestiya stresses, that "the Chinese leaders are continuing to make use of people who have succumbed to bribery in their struggle against the unity and cohesion of the WCM."

June 15-20: The Sino-Soviet conflict loomed large at the Fourth Congress of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party, beginning with the unexpectedly strong remarks by First Secretary Gomulka in his 6-hour opening speech. He sharply denounced the Chinese, who, in pursuit of their "great-power ambitions," have indulged in policies "that have nothing to do with M-L or proletarian internationalism." "The whole activity of the Chinese Party proves that it opened the controversy not in order to get at the truth but in order to cause a break." "The main reason for its insane attacks" on the CPSU was Moscow's refusal to help Peking produce nuclear weapons, he charged.

Gomulka said that the calling of a world conference should not depend "solely on the arbitrary will of the Chinese, but preparations should begin when the majority of parties are ready." "The refusal of a single



(#31 Chronology Cont.)

party or of several parties cannot be considered an insurmountable obstacle to the convening of such a conference," he said, although he also added that "parties representing the most important regions of the world" should participate. The printed text distributed in advance contained a much stronger statement -- "Parties which do not take part in a conference thus prepared will prove that they have placed themselves outside the international movement" -- which Gomulka dropped before delivery.

Observers attributed the Gomulka shift to the Chinese-supported violation of the cease-fire in Laos, where Poland is a member of the ICC, and to the activities of pro-Chinese elements in Poland as described subsequently by Polish speakers Titkow and Kliszko.

Soviet chief delegate Podgorny denounced Chinese splitting activities, said preparations for a world conference should start as soon as possible and hailed Gomulka's assurance that his party would take part. The Bulgarian, Czech, East German and Hungarian delegates all called for a conference now, while the Rumanian, Yugoslav and Italian delegates failed to mention it. No Chinese-aligned, or any other Asian, African or Latin American parties, were invited. Gomulka was "unanimously" reelected and some of the "liberals" on the CC were dropped.

June 16: NCNA distributed excerpts published in the April issue of the monthly Tuyen Huan (Propaganda and Training from a lecture by Hoang Tung, Chief Editor of the North Vietnamese daily Nhan Dan, to a meeting of cadres. Hoang Tung accuses the modern revisionists of "echoing the fallacies advanced by the revisionists and right opportunists of the Second International," fallacies which "had been exploded by Stalin... in his renowned writings collected under the title Problems of Leninism." Among his conclusions: "Revolution succeeded first in one weakest spot of the capitalist world after another, in countries where capitalism developed sluggishly or in backward agricultural countries. It cannot as yet succeed in a developed capitalist country. The large expanse of Asia, Africa, and Latin America represents ... (capitalism's) soft underbelly, and its most vulnerable spot where all kinds of contradictions are concentrated..." Hanoi Radio broadcasts a review of an editorial from the June issue of the Party's monthly theoretical journal Hoc Tap: "it is necessary to defeat thoroughly modern revisionism, the main danger to the ICM and the source of the present division and partisanship." Chinese press publishes extensive excerpts on 21st.

June 18: Izvestiya publishes from the June issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism an article by Eduardo Mora Valverde, a leading member of the Costa Rican People's Vanguard Party, describing a meeting of a number of Latin American Communist leaders with Mao-Tse-tung on 3 March 1959. Mao said at the beginning: "We want no reconciliation with the U.S. The U.S. must obey us. Otherwise we do not want to enter into negotiations with it...." Mora asks: "Does the establishment of diplomatic relations among countries with different social systems mean 'reconciliation?' Or maybe the Chinese Government established diplomatic relations with France because they decided to 'reconcile' with French imperialism." Mora stresses that the Chinese leaders have "regarded with contempt" the efforts of



and "it should be pointed out that the attitude of the Chinese leaders to the U.N. has not changed in the five years since that conversation.

Mora quotes Mao as saying: "We have learned much (the policy of brinksmanship) from Foster Dulles....As for me, I like international tension."

#### ADDENDUM

June 20: Speaking at a Communist-organized "Second Asian Economic Seminar" in Pyongyang, North Korea, Chinese delegation Chief Nan Han-chen warned the Afro-Asian nations represented against the "great-power, chauvinistic and national-egotist manner" in which the "modern revisionists" are extending economic aid. (Further analysis in next installment.)

June 22: Yugoslav President Tito met Rumanian President Gheorghiu-Dej in a suddenly arranged conference in the Rumanian village of Piscia near the Yugoslav border. The brief communique said that "Problems of mutual interest in the field of bilateral relations as well as of the international workers movement and the current international situation were discussed," and stressed that the talks took place "in a comradely and cordial atmosphere and in the spirit of full mutual trust."

29 June 1964

733. 3 September: 25th Anniversary of the Outbreak of World War II

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**BACKGROUND:** The year 1964 has been marked by an unusual number of new memoirs, new commemorations and new controversies concerning World War II. This rehashing of history affords Communist propagandists handy opportunities during the quarter-century anniversary to clean up Moscow's soiled image in the eyes of new generations and less sophisticated individuals.

Scholarly attempts by historians to identify the single or primary "cause" for the outbreak of war in 1939 have thus far not been successful. Hitler is generally given the lion's share of blame, though the objective consensus is that Hitler's aims were greatly supported by Stalin as well as by Western myopia and diplomatic errors. A prime factor that is too often ignored or glossed over is that Hitler and his Third Reich could not have come to power in any case without the support of the German Communist Party, acting under directions from Moscow.\* Although "causes" leading to WWII can be traced back along numberless lines, it is unnecessary to look further than the events of the year 1939 itself to demolish the Kremlin's claims to anti-Fascism, "love of peace" or international good faith.

The relatively peaceful period of the winter of 1938-9 which the apparent success of Munich had bestowed on the nations of Europe was shattered by Hitler's brutal takeover of dismembered Czechoslovakia in March, 1939. Everything thereafter in international relations in Europe flowed directly or indirectly from this grave violation of the pledged word by the German dictator. With the Nazi occupation of Prague it had become quite clear that Hitler was not concerned with the revision of the Versailles Treaty nor with the principle of national self-determination, but simply with naked conquest.

The destruction of Czechoslovakia revealed the Nazi's true intentions and led to British guarantees to Poland and other States in East Europe. By the summer of 1939 all the great powers in Europe had entered into firm political and military engagements with one exception - the Soviet Union. Both sides then attempted to obtain the support of the Soviet Union, the one Power which still enjoyed a certain freedom of movement and decision. The diplomatic struggle for Soviet support took place

\*A wide range of documentation supports this point. Four books that bear it out are: Soviet Espionage, Dallin; Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, Kennan; A Century of Conflict, Possony; and The Politics of Totalitarianism, John A. Armstrong, Random House, 1961

on two fronts: the one more or less public; the other quite secret. On the visible front, the Western Powers sought to bring the Soviet Union into a defensive system to prevent further aggression by Hitler. The possibility of the two ideologically hostile totalitarian States coming together on questions pertaining to the Eastern European States was considered out of the question by the West. The German efforts to secure Soviet support took place on the secret front, though they are now known to a very large extent from the published archives\* of the German Foreign Office. These efforts centered on the fact that Poland was the next victim on Hitler's schedule of conquest, and he desired to forestall interference by the Soviet Union, or even to induce it to join in the attack on Poland.

Whether the actual moving force behind the German-Soviet pact of 1939 was primarily Nazi or Soviet will probably never be known for certain in the absence of first-hand evidence as to the secret intentions of Soviet foreign policy at the time. At the end of July, however, the Germans confronted the Soviets with a clear alternative: what could Britain offer the Soviet Union, and what could Germany? Britain could at best offer participation in a European war and the enmity of Germany, which could scarcely be worth-while goals for Russia. Germany, on the other hand, could offer "neutrality and the hope of staying out of a possible European conflict, and, if Moscow wished, a German-Russian understanding on matters of mutual interest which would be to the advantage of both countries as in earlier times."\*\* The secret agreement according to which the whole political system of Eastern and Central Europe was to be divided between Germany and the Soviet Union was beginning to take shape.

Amongst other factors which had long affected Nazi actions was the desire to avoid a war on two fronts. Their scheme had been to destroy or neutralize all potential enemies on Germany's eastern border before opening an attack on the West. Faced with Japan's aggressive attitude and the undeclared Soviet-Japanese War, Moscow had similar causes for apprehension. Thus the two Powers ended by helping each other out of the snares they had laid or were on the point of laying for each other.

Stalin's Foreign Minister Molotov signed the German-Soviet treaty of non-aggression with Hitler's Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on 23 August. He also signed the secret appendix which divided the spheres of interest of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR in Eastern and Central Europe. Western statesmen did not, at least openly, challenge the Soviet contention that the pact was for "peaceful" purposes or point out its political and legal meaning -- i.e. that each side was thereby free to concentrate aggression against third nations.

\*Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, (Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office), Dept. of State Publication 3023, 1943

Communists explained the Soviet about-face as a peace policy; but the cadres themselves knew that Stalin was following Lenin's doctrine in preserving Soviet strength for Communist conquest while goading the imperialists to wear themselves out fighting each other.

Although the foregoing has dealt primarily with the events of the year 1939, the entire WW II era was replete with examples of Soviet double dealing. The French Communist Party (PCF), an undisguised tool of Stalin, mirrored the duplicities of the Soviets by going through ludicrous contortions in following the twists of Kremlin policy. So did all the other CP's including those in the U.S., U.K., etc. Until the conclusion of the Soviet-Nazi friendship pact on 23 Aug 39, the PCF echoed the Soviet "anti-Fascist" line with paeans of anti-Hitlerism. Promptly following the pact the PCF, though by then outlawed and driven underground, dutifully switched to urging defeatism and anti-militarism on Frenchmen, particularly the military. Along with its propaganda, the Party carried on a campaign of sabotage against France's war effort, damaging aircraft, armaments, and anything else that could help France in its short-lived stand against German aggression. After the French surrender in June 1940, PCF representatives opened negotiations with the Nazi Kommandantura in Paris, which led to PCF collaboration with the Nazi occupiers. When the first nuclei of French resistance began operating against the Nazi occupation in the fall of 1940, the PCF saw this as a direct threat to their plans, and worked frantically to discredit the resistance. Their target for constant and virulent attack was Gen. de Gaulle; from then until June 1941 the major PCF onslaught was toward the Gaullist resistance. Throughout the months of the abnormal union between the Soviets and Nazis, the Party's job was to bring as many Frenchmen as possible to look upon Russia as their liberator. In the process the PCF revealed clearly that France as a nation was expendable if Moscow so willed it.

On 22 June 41, before news of the German attack on Russia arrived, l'Humanite was still faithfully hacking away at the old line:

"The English miss no opportunity to inform listeners on the imminence of a Nazi-Soviet conflict. The Moscow radio, levelheaded as always, gives the lie to reports of a German ultimatum."


Then the news of the German attack came, and almost in the same breath the PCF composers transposed key, motif, and theme, and the Party chorus blared forth its new choral. "All Frenchmen salute the soldiers of de Gaulle as fighters against Hitler... The domestic front is an extension of the distant front. All France to the barricades against the murderous Hun! Aux armes!" [See unclassified attachment for statement of Nazi-Soviet relations in WW II. For further material on the myth of Soviet "anti-Fascism," see BPG No. 730 of 4 May 64, 20 July 64.]

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Twentieth Anniversary of the Anti-Hitler Plot, and Prop Note 19 (B), 5 June 63, Communist-Nazi Relations, with unclassified attachment, Communist-Nazi Relations - The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in World War Two (176 pp).]

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For Eastern and Central European audiences in particular, we review how Stalin conspired secretly with the Nazis before and during the war, which the Kremlin initially wanted for the same reasons as did Hitler, and annexed vast territories belonging to neighboring countries.

Students, youths and intellectuals are vulnerable targets for Communist whitewashing of Moscow's past misdeeds. Before such audiences, we spread the full facts of Nazi-Soviet collaboration, of Comintern directives to local communists to sabotage Allied war efforts and to subvert resistance movements, while noting the omissions and distortions of those facts by Communist propagandists and "historians." We recall that Stalin originally acknowledged that American lend-lease constituted the difference between defeat and victory for the USSR, and we ridicule the subsequent and still continuing efforts by the Kremlin to support charges that the Americans not only refused to help the Soviet war effort but obstructed it.

A basic Communist tactic which reveals itself particularly in wartime is to foment debilitating conflicts among non-Communists. To governments and audiences in developing or unstable areas we point to a striking example of how this tactic is used to weaken non-Communist countries - Moscow's wartime appeal to Warsaw residents to rise against the occupying Wehrmacht "in concert with the approaching Red Army."\* Marshall Rokossovsky's troops thereupon halted deliberately at the edge of Warsaw and waited quietly for 63 days while more than 200,000 Polish men,

\*The Rape of Poland, Stanislaw Milolajczyk, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1943

women and children were slaughtered helplessly in the uprising. And there is ample evidence that the Soviets, for ulterior political reasons, time and again withheld from the U.S. and British new information that could have materially shortened WW II or even have made unnecessary the use of the atom bomb.

Wherever Communists attempt to deny their aggressive policies of the past or present, we point out that even now, when they are seeking better relations with the West, they continue to lie and slander the Free World in their official organs. Since treaties or agreements are only as good as the will to observe them, we warn that positive steps to orient the Communists toward the Free World must in every case be taken with firmness, with insistence on protection of the rights of free peoples, and with ironclad guarantees that the Free World can positively verify full Communist compliance with their agreements.

Dictator Khrushchev's new treaty of "friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance" with lesser dictator Ulbricht should be challenged publicly and pointedly wherever possible as to whether it includes secret protocols as did the last "friendship treaty" between Soviet and German dictators in 1939.



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29 June 1964

799. Portents of UNCTAD

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BACKGROUND:

References:

- 1) Unclassified attachment h/w: "Outcome of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 23 March - 15 June 1963."
- 2) BPG #137-S, item #765: "Soviet Foreign Trade and the UN Conference on Trade and Development," 24 March 1964.

The Soviet Union. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which met in Geneva 23 March - 15 June, 1964, was at least partly the long delayed outcome of Moscow's futile campaign against GATT and the Common Market. Responsible for her own exclusion from non-communist economic organizations, and unable to undermine them, the Soviet Union campaigned for the new organization, which the developing nations wanted also, to give her better leverage in world economic relations. However, the USSR, in helping to create UNCTAD, did not foresee and was not prepared for the problems which arose not just for the West but for herself. In addition to those problems attendant on balancing the needs of mature and just developing economies in any world organization, the Soviets now find themselves confronted by an antagonistic Communist China determined to persuade developing countries to oppose the Soviet Union.

Problem: (FYI Only)

Western diplomats deserve praise for their success at Geneva in maintaining contact with reasonable elements from the LDC's (less developed countries), and in averting a collapse of UNCTAD. Nevertheless, foreboding signs developed at this conference. This meeting gave concrete form to a tendency which has been latent for a number of years: the tendency of the world's nations to form hostile blocs, one sometimes called the "northern" or "wealthy" bloc and the other the "southern" or "poor" bloc. At UNCTAD, the "southern" bloc, organized as "the 75," was able to outvote the "northerners" repeatedly, and they might be able to do the same thing in the UN General Assembly, where final arrangements for the new permanent trading organization, the Trade and Development Board, will be worked out.

Whatever the governments of the "northern" countries might wish to do, there are limits to the concessions they can make to "southern" demands. A change in US policy on preferences would require the consent of Congress -- which is unlikely --

and sweeping renegotiations of existing agreements, and even if this were done the trade impact for most LDC's would be marginal. Elimination of tariffs on tropical products will not materially improve the market for these products; the fact is that tariffs on these goods are for the most part low already and price elasticity of demand is low. If governments open developed country markets to other kinds of LDC products too quickly, for example to textiles, they will confront political hostility within their own countries. It is doubtful that the developed countries will augment their aid to LDC's substantially in the near future; the developed countries have Appalachias of their own to shore up. Thus the demands of the "southerners" are unlikely to be met in full, and this may cause their complaints to become more bitter than before. Instability at home and fear of further economic setbacks already tempt some LDC spokesmen to make demagogic, unrealistic demands. A vicious circle may develop, offering opportunities for exploitation by Moscow, and even more, by Peking.

The new board is definitely more of an international trade organization than the US desired, since it is independent of ECOSOC [UN Council on Economic and Social questions], in a position to make direct recommendations to the UN General Assembly, and since it will have its own permanent secretariat. If, as is likely, this secretariat is recruited from the staff which organized the Geneva conference, it may be unresponsive to the US point of view. Since voting arrangements are yet to be worked out--with General Assembly concurrence--there is a chance that some safeguards can be incorporated to protect the interests of the developed countries. The underdeveloped countries are wary, however, of any departure from the rule of "one country, one vote." At the General Assembly this voting issue could become entangled with the question of admitting Communist China to the UN. An official was heard at Geneva to threaten that his country might vote for Chicom admission if it did not get satisfaction on economic problems.

No international gathering can force the developed nations to take economic measures they do not wish to take. But there is a danger that the developed countries, especially the US, may be isolated within the UN, giving rise to mutual hostility, and causing a loss of US influence in the less developed areas. Some of the positions taken by the LDC's could provide propaganda ammunition for elements in the US which seek to eliminate foreign aid or to bring about a US withdrawal from the UN. In the world as a whole, there is a threat that the "north" versus "south" conflict may take on a racist aspect; this is shown by the Chicom-engineered exclusion of the USSR from the post-UNCTAD Afro-Asian meeting.

Economically, a "north" vs. "south" conflict is senseless. That the LDC's have the exports they do have is largely due to the past activities of the "colonialists," who developed plantations and mines to satisfy demands in the developed countries. Dependence on single exports should be ended, and the developed countries (the US, Europe, Japan, etc.) should help. But both developed and less developed countries need each other's markets.

The main hope is that developing country governments will realize that they can solve their economic problems only if they cooperate with the developed countries. Economic assistance cannot be legislated or coerced, it must be induced. At least some of the LDC delegates came to realize during the conference that one such meeting cannot by itself solve the economic problems of the world. End FYI

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The following arguments should be used, adapted to local audiences:

1. Cooperation is essential between the more and the less developed countries. Quote the Times of India (13 June):

"A trade organization which faced a boycott by the Western countries and Japan could at best have served only as a propaganda platform. It could not possibly have helped to promote world trade. Since the Western countries and Japan account for 80 per cent of international trade and it is to their markets that the developing countries have to gain access, their cooperation is essential for the success of a world trade organization."

Trade takes place when there is agreement on a transaction between buyer and seller: not by order. Cooperation would also further the development of financial and economic aid programs: if a developed country sees that its aid brings it no recognition or understanding, it will not continue that aid.

2. Stability, both domestic and international, is required for economic development. The flight of capital from certain less developed countries (esp. Latin American) poses a problem for all non-Communist areas: the LDC's lose the capital; European countries find "hot money" from the LDC's causing inflation in their economies; and the US sees much of the aid it is providing cancelled out: (See Press Comment, 15 June 1964, p.3.) Demands for greatly increased assistance and overly-lurid pictures of decaying terms of trade do nothing to discourage capital flight. (Note: this argument is especially recommended for elite audiences in the more-than-a-little developed countries, such as India and the major Latin American countries.)

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3. Certain irresponsible LDC spokesmen (e.g., from new African countries) and irresponsible Communists seek to make political capital out of the demand for help for the LDC's. They care nothing about working out a constructive program; instead, they seek to drive a wedge between the "capitalists" and the LDC's, for self-seeking political reasons.

4. The Soviets proved to have nothing of substance to offer at Geneva. They have no significant market for the products of the less developed countries: Soviet imports from developing countries amount to about \$1 billion as opposed to \$19 billion in imports by developed free world countries from the LDC's. While the Soviets pay gold or convertible currency for imports from the developed free world, for example for grain from the US, they make bilateral agreements with the LDC's which compel the latter to take payment in Soviet goods on Soviet terms. Their plan for an international trade organization is designed to make such bilateral trade universal.

5. Contrary to claims by the Soviets and some LDC economists that it is an organization of the industrial world, GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) now has over 73 countries affiliated with it in one way or another, and two-thirds of them are developing nations. As noted in attachment, the countries of Eastern Europe, though Communist, are anxious to affiliate with GATT, or to become full members. GATT has made studies of the development process, has adopted a set of basic principles to give access to markets to developing countries, and is trying to explore with LDC's the steps needed to increase their exports.

6. The so-called LDC's stand at various stages of development. In many, it would be well to argue that "We are not really a poor country, and a policy appropriate for the poorest African ex-colonies is not appropriate for us." Assets in partially developed countries should maintain that while their countries need to develop, they are mature, cultured nations, and do not need a paternalistic organization to plan their trade. Such an organization as the Soviets desire would probably seek, like CEMA, to keep the less industrialized countries from full industrial development; reference might be made to recent Rumanian experiences.

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29 June 1964

300. Rumania: Unruly Satellite

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**BACKGROUND:** Recent world news and editorial comment has featured the independent posture which Rumania appears to be assuming in Eastern Europe. Some of these new developments have brought Rumania into sharp contrast with other countries of the Soviet bloc.

Perhaps the most publicized development, if not the most significant one, has been Rumania's resistance to the Moscow-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), which body sought to keep Rumania in the role of pastoral breadbasket (and producer of raw materials, notably oil) for the Communist bloc. In the name of national economic sovereignty, Bucharest has successfully blocked any CEMA moves which might interfere with increased Rumanian industrialization. While growth of the more industrialized countries of the bloc has suffered serious slowdowns, Rumanian industrialization has advanced rapidly from its low starting base, an advance which Bucharest is bent on continuing regardless of possible effects on Eastern European economic integration as a whole or Bloc neighbors individually.

Long standing Rumanian-Soviet economic and political differences culminated in a 22 April 64 "declaration" by the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party (RWP). This widely publicized declaration\* was purported to set forth the Rumanian position on the Sino-Soviet conflict, but it was more a proclamation of Rumania's right and intent to exercise independence and equality in the Communist world. It likewise rejected any suggestion that Moscow is the center of world communism. Among other things it stated that Rumanian relations with the USSR must be based on "national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, reciprocal gain, fraternal mutual aid, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for territorial integrity." There have since been persistent reports and rumors from Bucharest that the regime is whipping up support for this attitude among its own followers and is internally denouncing past Soviet exploitation of Rumania in terms verging on the polemic.

\*Reproduced in full in SCINTEIA of 26 Apr 64, in FBIS No. 83 (USSR & East Europe) of 23 April, and analyzed in Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dissensions, BPG No. 141 of 18 May 1964.

The reactions of Bucharest to the Sino-Soviet rift have been much like those of the Italian CP. Both parties have exploited the schism to further their own interests. However, neither would want the conflict to reach an irreparable, formal Sino-Soviet break -- this would deprive them of the bargaining lever they now have with Moscow and might result in an attempt by Moscow to re-impose strict discipline on the European and other anti-Chicom parties. Concern over this possibility led Bucharest to attempt mediation between Moscow and Peking with a view to keeping the dispute within bounds.

Rumania's growing industrialization has been augmented by an improved agricultural situation and a rapid expansion of foreign trade, especially with the West. Collectivization facilitated food exports by tightening state control over agriculture, with the depressing effect that collectivization has on agricultural production having been offset temporarily by technical innovations. However, some new means will have to be found to raise agricultural production from its present plateau if overall growth is to be sustained. Active negotiations are meanwhile being undertaken with the object of further stepping up political and trade relationships between Rumania and Free World countries.

The Bucharest regime has taken various other steps that have added to the impression of relaxation. In a calculated de-Russification campaign the regime has reversed its past orientation toward the Russian language and literature, while stressing Rumania's historical identity and its Latin culture, and Radio Bucharest has greatly curtailed its rebroadcasts of Soviet radio programs. The regime has ceased jamming Western Broadcasts, and a large number of political prisoners have been amnestied in 1964, but the regime has not yet adopted any liberalization on the domestic political scene comparable to the changes taken in its relations with the Soviet bloc and with the West.

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there is only one dictatorially controlled political party - with that party at the same time embodying the government and in control of all information media and security organs - there is but limited scope for progress in the attainment of human rights, democracy, and true liberalization. We warn that whereas Bucharest's "emancipation from Satellite status" is being widely heralded (by Rumanian Communist spokesmen) as "national independence," the regime is still part of the Communist movement and is exploiting Khrushchev's internal crises and the Sino-Soviet conflict to consolidate its own domestic power base to the greatest degree possible without at the same time relinquishing any vital part of the dictatorial controls it has so long exercised over the rights and freedoms of the individual Rumanians. We urge upon these targets the thesis that the only safe support for the Rumanian leaders lies in their own people, and that they can get it only by making available to them (for the first time in recorded history) essential human rights and freedoms.


To economic planners and industrialists everywhere, we use the spectacle of Communist Rumania being driven to the Free World for agricultural commodities, credits, and industrial plants and technology, to demonstrate the failures and imperialist character of Communist Bloc economic planning and "cooperation."

To Communist and extreme leftist audiences, we use Rumanian developments as a further evidence of the "fragmentation" and weakening of the international Communist movement which has been fostered by the Sino-Soviet rift; we attempt, in either gray or black output, to continue to encourage (at least by implication) the other Soviet Satellites in East Europe to follow Rumania's lead in utilizing the Sino-Soviet split to achieve greater national independence.

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801. Communist Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism



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BACKGROUND: The problem. Communists characterize all Western aid to, support of, investment in and trade with developing countries as neo-colonialist and as dangerous. To some extent, they have been successful in keeping the worst image of 19th century western imperialism alive and in casting suspicion upon real efforts of the mature western countries to assist developing countries. Paralleling this campaign, the Communists are aggressively supporting national liberation movements in an attempt to destroy all vestiges of capitalism in the newly independent and still dependent countries and to sever all their relations with Western Democratic countries. The ultimate objective is to destroy all western influence and to convert every country into a communist nation within a communist imperialist international system.

Why Communists harp on Western imperialism. In addition to the smokescreen provided by charges of Western neo-colonialism for their own imperialism, Communists have an Achilles heel to hide. A major tenet of their theory holds that imperialist countries will fade when they are deprived of their colonial bases; but the economic health of the Western Democracies has improved as their former colonies have become independent. Communists also expected that the colonies, once free, would almost automatically come into the communist camp; but the newly independent nations have not followed this course. Faced with these two errors, one of which exposes a critical fault in the Marx-Lenin theory of the inevitability of history (i.e. historical materialism), Communists are making a tremendous effort to find a scapegoat, namely neo-colonialism. Now that the colonial empires are almost gone, they have had to shift from their former charges of political imperialism and concentrate on economic imperialism (neo-colonialism) in an attempt to convince new nations that the threat of capitalist domination continues unimpaired.

What the Communists have to work with. The history of western imperialism is still very much alive in the former colonial regions of the world -- some writers speak of the anti-imperialist cyclone which followed the Second World War. It is not too difficult, by means of a single example here or there, to persuade many people in these regions that the Western Democracies (the capitalist countries) have changed neither their methods nor their goals, namely exploitation. More insidious for the West, perhaps, is the fact that imperialism is devoid of specific content or direct experience for many and is an amorphous, emotionally-loaded spectre. The imperialist

is thus easily made the scapegoat for problems, wants, deprivations and injustices, -- he becomes a vague kind of ruthless, dominating monster -- one who has taken even what was never there to be had. This concept, held by both the illiterate and the irrational (as well as by others who should know better), is used effectively by the Communists to damage any Western offer or relationship, merely by applying the label "imperialist."

Equally difficult for the West is the usefulness of the so-called imperialist threat in the hands of opportunistic leaders (including officials) in developing countries. Knowing the falseness of the label, they nonetheless use it to their advantage in rallying the masses against something (e.g. the government, a party or an official), for something (e.g. higher wages, land, bigger grants-in-aid), or behind something (e.g. suppression of the press, territorial expansion).

Then there are the real problems faced by developing countries whose more or less inexperienced leaders are groping in highly unstable situations for simple forms on which to model their desperately needed economic, political and social organizations. At the very least, capitalism may appear to them conservative and, more seriously, reactionary. Given a climate which appears to require immediate mobilization of all resources of the society and results that show, drastic action is felt to be necessary, at least in the form of big organizations and big programs. Leaders and the vocal minority want new, progressive, energetic, revolutionary designs, consonant with their unique indigenous culture; they want panaceas to meet what was termed a few years ago the rising tide of expectations among the peoples of their developing countries.

Communists play upon this state of mind to create suspicion that the former colonizers, in either opposing communist systems or advocating democratic ones, seek merely to maintain their own institutional forms as a means of controlling the new countries. The adoption of capitalist organizations, they say, for example, will expose the country to foreign investors who will exploit their natural resources, and will force the country to remain in an inferior position as a source of raw materials while providing markets for the finished goods of their former masters. This is, in communist terms, neo-colonialism. The fact that few of the developing countries have leadership in breadth or in depth is charged against the colonial powers. Extensive illiteracy in a country provides a living memorial for the communist charge that it was a deliberate imperialist policy to keep them in ignorant subjection. Working within capitalist institutions, the communists say, places the inexperienced leader in an unequal position, thus affording the neo-colonialist power the opportunity for continued domination.

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Lenin on imperialism. In his monograph on imperialism, written shortly before he returned to Russia in 1917, Lenin treats it primarily as an economic phenomenon linked with the last stages of capitalism, thusly --

... capitalism is that stage of development in which the domination of monopolies and finance has taken place; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world by the international trusts has begun, and in which the partition of the earth by the greatest imperialist countries has been completed.  
["Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"]

Logic supported by history demonstrates that these criteria apply to the Communist states and not to the Western Democracies. For example: Communist countries and not the Western Democracies are seeking to "partition the earth," as the facts of 20th century colonization and de-colonization show; the CPSU and the CCP use international fronts as part of their world communist effort to dominate the world -- replacing whatever goal international trusts were purported to have had; Soviet Bloc and CCP "export of capital" in aid, trade credit and similar economic activities (not that of the Western Democracies) "has acquired pronounced importance" in attempts to assert control over other countries. Going back to Marx' basic theory, material wealth is far from being the sole generating force of political power (i.e. capitalists form states to protect their economic empires). The CPSU and CCP have demonstrated that organizations (e.g. a revolutionary elite) and politically controlled states (i.e. again, parties) can take control of all economic resources and shape society.

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
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The hand that is bitten. Algeria's Ben Bella referred to American aid as "poisoned bread." American wheat is feeding about one-third of the Algerian population; American aid supplies some 100,000 jobs (reforestation, anti-erosion, water supply). The people of Algeria should be concerned that the people of the US might suddenly decide that they should no longer force their bounty upon Algeria -- since the abundance of their economy and the know-how of their technicians are not

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are not really wanted and since they are only condemned for their efforts to help a developing country. It is unfortunate that Mr. K's recent credit extension of \$125 million (he does not have grain for them) will not go very far and in all probability will not reach down to the ordinary citizen as does American assistance.

Other localities where American (or Western) aid is similarly being derided should speculate in the same vein. No one, extending a helping hand, wants to have that hand bitten more than once.

In many countries there is a hue and cry -- not to say a demand -- that the Western Democracies support them with vast aid. At the same time, demagogues and Communists in these countries belabor all relations, including economic assistance of the most generous proportions, with these same Western Democracies as evilly intentioned, dangerous, self-seeking and, of course, as imperialist -- i.e. neo-colonialist. This truly disinterested Western desire to help developing countries reach their own maturity, will, if such reactions persists, probably turn to a different kind of disinterest -- i.e. indifference. US newspapers are not without articles and comment that this indifference already exists in some quarters.

Having your cake and eating it. Opportunists, for example in countries where there are American or allied military installations, gain followings for themselves and the Communists by charging the West with war-mongering, aggressive imperialism and other epithets. On the other hand, trade unions and various other groups organize demonstrations and attack US offices (e.g. consular and USIA) and the US Government whenever American activities employing indigenous labor are stopped. Wherever such situations exist, it should be argued that it is not possible for long to have one's cake and eat it too. This argument should be extended to fit other cases (i.e. road, factory building, agricultural development) to explain to opportunists that their apparent short term gains in agitating against Western projects will eventually turn out to be their long term disaster -- as people discover that they have suffered.

Incidentally, returning to the matter of Allied bases, it might cause some stir among local audiences in North Africa if it is pointed out that the persons most vehemently demanding the removal of US/NATO bases are strangely quiet about the Soviet building of indigenous fortresses in the same region,



802 AF, FE, NE. Non-Aligned (Belgrade-type and Afro-Asian  
(Bandung-type) Conferences

- REFERENCES: A. BPG #135, Item 748 (Prospects of a Second Afro-Asian [Bandung] Conference and a Second Nonaligned [Belgrade] Conference) dated 24 February 1964
- B. DIR 11528 dated 1 April 1964
- C. BPG #140, Item 779 ("Bandung" Afro-Asian Conference Scheduled for Africa 1965) dated 4 May 1964
- D. Propagandist's Guide to Communist Dis-

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BACKGROUND: The preparatory meetings for each Conference had decided that

- a. the Second Non-Aligned Conference would be held at the chiefs-of-state level in Cairo in the first week in October; and
- b. the Second Afro-Asian Conference would take place at the chiefs-of-state level in March 1965 in Africa, with Accra the most likely site as of this writing.

Developments since the two preparatory meetings still suggest that the Afro-Asian conference will be considerably more detrimental to U.S. policy interests than the non-aligned one, although both Conferences will furnish platforms for attacks on the West and will propagate the national liberation movements. This judgment is primarily based on the fact that neither Chi-coms nor Soviets will be represented at the Non-Aligned Conference, hopefully giving some moderate nations considerable opportunity to influence the proceedings of this larger of the two gatherings. This is not to mean, however, that the Non-Aligned Conference will not be considerably anti-Western in basic orientation, but certainly less so than the Afro-Asian one.

The effectiveness of the Afro-Asian Conference will, however, also be in question, mainly because the Soviet-Chicom quarrel already overshadows the preparations. For the Afro-Asian bloc this Conference is a major event; for Moscow and Peking it means largely determining who shall have the greater influence on these two continents. The Soviets have lost the first round but are determined to make a come-back. At the

preparatory meeting in Djakarta no agreement could be reached on Soviet participation as proposed by India and Ceylon -- the opponents, led by the Chicoms, argued that the USSR is not an Asian nation. This question has in the interim been bitterly fought by both Communist sides, the Soviets inter alia charging the Chicoms with introducing the racial issue. The discussion on both sides is pure sophistry, but the issue is clear: which one of the two chief Communist contestants is to have the major influence in Asia and Africa? No doubt the Soviets still count on such influential Afro-Asian leaders as Nasser to support their participation in the Conference. But the quarrel between the Soviets and the Chicoms over the Afro-Asian conference participation question (as well as in AAPSO and in International Fronts) may be detrimental to the Conference. Also, the Conference will have to cope with other differences (Indonesia and Malaysia, India and Pakistan, etc.) which will stand in the way of reaching unanimity in the proceedings and in action.

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## NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

When French-British-Soviet military discussions broke down on 15 August 1939 (following Hitler's destruction of Czechoslovakia), the Nazi's intensified their efforts for a settlement with Moscow. The invasion of Poland was planned for the second half of August, and if Hitler wanted to keep to that schedule without risking the dreaded war on two fronts, he had to get the pact with the Russians settled as quickly as possible. The attitude of hostility toward the Soviet Union was being dropped, and mid-August of 1939 became the point of intersection of the various lines of development when the knot for Hitler's war was finally being tied. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop hurried to Moscow on 23 August with the full authority of the Fuhrer to negotiate with authorized representatives of the Soviet Union a treaty of non-aggression as well as all related matters and to sign both the treaty and other agreements resulting from the treaty and, if possible, to see that the treaty and other agreements came into force immediately they were signed. On 23 August, within hours after Ribbentrop's arrival, the German-Soviet treaty of non-aggression, with its secret appendix, had been negotiated and signed.

The Soviet leaders proclaimed the "peaceful" purposes of the new pact and stated that it differed in no way from treaties which the Soviet Union had concluded with other Powers, including Poland. To put it mildly, this assertion was a downright lie. The German-Soviet agreement was not conceived within the normal framework of international treaties as understood theretofore: it represented a completely new type of non-aggression pact, the nature of which had been revealed years before by a man whose qualifications and intentions should be beyond all doubt: Litvinov, Molotov's predecessor as Soviet Foreign Minister. In a speech before the Assembly of the League of Nations on 14 September 1935 he clearly expounded the differences between the two types of treaty:

"We know of another political conception that is fighting the idea of collective security and is advocating bilateral pacts, and this is not even between all States, but only between States arbitrarily chosen for this purpose. Not every pact of non-aggression is concluded with a view to strengthening general peace. While non-aggression pacts concluded by the Soviet Union include a special clause for suspending the pact in cases of aggression committed by one of the parties against any third State, we know of other pacts of non-aggression which have no such clauses. This means that a State which has secured by such a pact of non-aggression its rear or its flank obtains the facility of attacking with impunity, third States."

Molotov's predecessor thereby made it quite clear that in the Soviet mind, a pact of the type concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union is not likely to serve the cause of peace.

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Such pacts are rather an instrument of naked and self-seeking power politics which does not shrink from making common cause with the aggressor. Despite Moscow's peaceful protestations, the so-called non-aggression treaty proved to be what it was in fact intended to be: a purely business transaction - a tactical expedient for dividing up and controlling the Eastern European world between Russia and Germany.

Even more important than the publicized parts of the non-aggression pact was its secret protocol which was not exposed until after the war. This protocol demarcated exactly the Russian and German "spheres of interest" in a wide area extending from Finland to the mouth of the Danube. The great significance of the pact and the secret agreement as a factor in the causes of the Second World War raises questions as to the motives which induced the two dictators to agree at the eleventh hour. That a treaty of "friendship" was concluded at all between the two systems, deadly enemies ideologically though they were, has been described as a "triumph of political expediency over ideological antitheses." Churchill said that it was questionable "whether Hitler or Stalin regarded the whole affair with greater loathing." A search for German motives throws light on the genuineness of the anti-Communism which Hitler had theretofore preached so zealously. Hindsight reveals that his intensive anti-Communist activity was a purely tactical expedient, intended to help justify rearmament and mask his lust for conquest. The Soviets' abrupt withdrawal from the fight against Fascism which, according to the Comintern, was the most evil and dangerous breed of capitalism and imperialism, was an equally wrenching about-face. In an effort to parry the criticism on ideological grounds which came from its own rank and file as well as from the Western Allies it had spurned, the Soviet Union tried to portray its foreign policy as a peace policy and the pact as an instrument of peace. The true Soviet motives emerge quite clearly from the published German Foreign Office documents\* on the negotiations: on the one hand, the reduction of hostility toward Germany and the desire to carve up Eastern and Central Europe in co-operation with Germany; on the other hand, the achievement of better relations with Japan, aided by Germany. Some historians have argued that the British-French-Soviet negotiations were doomed by the mutual suspicions which dogged them. Be that as it may, it is clear that the all-important reason for Stalin's decision to come to terms with Hitler was not his mistrust of the Western Powers, but the unexpectedly generous offer made by the Nazis.

In order to reconcile the German-Soviet pact with revolutionary ideology, the Kremlin revived Lenin's slogan that the Soviet Union was "surrounded by hostile capitalist states." According to official Soviet interpretations the second imperialist war had already begun with Ethiopia, Spain, etc., and world revolutionary aims clearly required that the Soviet Union keep out of it and let the imperialists weaken one another. How

\*Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, (Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office), Dept. of State Publication 3023, Approved For Release 2000/04/14 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080003-0

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the Soviets managed to deceive their allies about this fixed long-term goal was to be learned first by Nazi Germany and later by the Western democracies. In the eyes of the Soviet leaders the two basic elements of Soviet foreign policy, the national interest of the sovereign State and the goal of world revolution both demanded the conclusion of a pact with Germany to support that policy. Needless to say, the Soviet purpose contained not a trace of the kind of ethical motive generally associated with the concept of peace in the Western world. Like their Nazi partners, the Soviet leaders boasted about the durability of the pact with Germany and the finality of the new orientation. At the close of negotiations with Ribbentrop, Stalin himself stressed explicitly how seriously the Soviet Union took this pact, and he gave his word of honor that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner. Two years later, however, after Hitler had violated the pact by attacking the Soviet Union, a very different tune was heard from Moscow. Stalin then gave the following interpretation of the motives on which he alleged the pact with Hitler had been based:

"One might ask: How was it possible for the Soviet government to embark on a pact of non-aggression with such treacherous monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Did not the Soviet government make a mistake? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two States. That was precisely what Germany offered us in 1939 - a peace pact. Could the Soviet government refuse such an offer? I think that no single peace-loving State can reject a peace agreement with a neighboring State even if such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop are at the head of it. But of course the indispensable condition is that the peace agreement shall not impair the territorial integrity, independence and honor of the peace-loving State, directly or indirectly. It is well known that the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was just that kind of pact. What did we gain by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany? We secured one and a half years of peace for our country and the chance to prepare our defensive forces, in case fascist Germany invaded our country in spite of the pact. That was a definite gain for us and a loss for fascist Germany."

Here Stalin keeps to the interpretation of the German-Soviet pact as an instrument of peace. He speaks of the territorial integrity and independence of his own country, but he completely ignores the fact that the pact cost Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland their territorial integrity and political independence.

The pact's secret agreement to which the Eastern European States fell victim is completely hushed up and regarded as non-existent not only by Soviet politicians but also by so-called Soviet historians. This is a prime example of tendentious



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Soviet handling of historical facts. In reply to the published documents of the German Foreign Office concerning origins of the German-Soviet treaty and its secret protocol, the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a publication entitled The Falsifiers of History in which the documents from the German archives were branded as biased and unauthentic. The Western Powers as well as Hitler are blamed for causing WW II because they made Nazi aggression possible through their appeasement. But in this apologia not a word is breathed about the secret agreement of 23 August 1939. Obviously the Soviet conception of historical scholarship is bound up with Marxist-Leninist ideology, according to which the historian must be free from "an exaggerated love for the facts." His ideological is far more important than his methodological training. "The real Soviet historian must be warlike and aggressive, his evaluation of historical facts is a political decision dictated by political motives." Against such lies the objective observer is bound to state that the real motives behind the Soviet leader's desire for an agreement with Nazi Germany were the prospect of destroying the Eastern European States and the hope of helping to touch off a war which was in the interests of the Soviet Union as much from a power-political as an ideological point of view. The fact that the power of the Soviet Union now extends to Central Europe is an historical consequence of the secret German-Soviet agreement of 23 August 1939.

(For further material on the myth of Soviet "anti-Fascism" and Communist performance in WW II see: Soviet Espionage, David Dallin, Yale University Press, 1955; Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, Kennan; A Century of Conflict, Stefan T. Possony, Henry Regnery Co., 1953; The Politics of Totalitarianism, John A. Armstrong, Random House, 1961; France Against Herself, Herbert Leuthy, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1955; France, A Communist Party in Action, Angelo Rossi (pseud.), Yale University Press, 1949; The Soviet History of WW II: Myths, Memories, and Realities, Matthew P. Gallagher, Praeger, 1963; The Strange Alliance, John Russell Deane, Viking, 1947.)

Despite expectations of a deadlock, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which convened at Geneva with representatives of 119 countries, succeeded in reaching a large measure of agreement. Communist hopes that there would be a complete collapse, or a vote by the less developed countries condemning the "capitalists" and the supposedly capitalistic GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), were disappointed. Soviet diplomats failed to convince delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America that the interests of the USSR and the less developed countries were identical.

At the same time, UNCTAD witnessed the birth of a new politico-economic power group, "the 75," a block of 75 less developed countries which frequently dominated the conference. Observers expect "the 75" to continue to push for better trading conditions and more assistance from the wealthier, more highly developed countries. But the more experienced leaders of "the 75" realize that they cannot get what they want without the cooperation of the developed countries and this cooperation cannot be forced.

The most important result of UNCTAD is its provision for a 55-member "Trade and Development Board," which will report to the UN General Assembly. This is not the "International Trade Organization" which Soviet diplomats have urged for many years; they have sought a replacement for GATT which would push for administered trade along the Soviet pattern. The new Board will have advisory powers, but no enforcement powers. It will have its own Secretariat, making it independent of ECOSOC (the UN's Economic and Social Council), with which, however, it is supposed to cooperate. The Board will discuss such topics as preferential tariffs and compensation for declining raw material prices.

Voting arrangements within the Board were a vexed question, since the developed countries have insisted that majorities of both developed and underdeveloped nations were necessary for any decision, while the less developed countries have tended to favor simple majority voting as the Board is to have 22 members from the Afro-Asian countries, 13 members from non-Communist developed countries including Japan and Australia, 9 members from Latin America, and 6 members from the Communist Bloc, a simple majority system would permit the less developed countries to pass virtually any measure they liked. The voting problem was not solved at Geneva, and UNCTAD has referred it to the Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, who will set up a conciliation committee to tackle the question. The final decision will rest with next fall's General Assembly.

Other decisions reached at UNCTAD included:

1. The developed countries agreed in principle to assign at least 1% of their national income to grants  
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2. The conference recommended that the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) study the possibility of financing to compensate the developing economies for persistent deterioration in the prices of primary products.

3. A demand that the developed countries grant tariff concessions and non-reciprocal preferences to the less developed countries was referred to a Committee to be named by U Thant.

4. The conference agreed in principle that the less developed countries should be granted easier access to world markets for their products. A study is to be made in this field, on an item by item basis.

5. The conference made provision for a review of a "world trade charter," a sweeping statement of principles proposed by the less developed countries, and opposed by the developed nations.

Current Soviet propaganda seeks to conceal the relative failure of the Soviet tactics at this conference. Until the closing stages, the Soviets were hampered by fears that they also would be asked to make a major material contribution to the developing nations, something the Soviet economy is far from able to muster at present. It was clear that they did not even fully control the economic policies of the East European countries, since Rumania, during UNCTAD, sent another delegation to Geneva to discuss membership not only in GATT but also in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; according to report, the Hungarians and Bulgarians have put out similar feelers, and Poland has renewed its long-standing application for full membership in GATT. A Rumanian official stated that Rumanians had sat in on meetings of "the 75," and that Rumania regarded itself as number 76. The Soviets had little to offer the developing countries, and the latter care more about getting concrete assistance than about endorsing a Soviet propaganda line.

The worst Soviet defeat was exclusion from a three-day meeting of the representatives of the "Bandung" countries, some 22 Asian and African nations, which took place in Geneva immediately after UNCTAD, and which was to review UNCTAD's performance. The Chinese Communists, who as non-UN members had been barred from UNCTAD, sent a 15 member delegation to this meeting, and did their utmost to stir up the other participants against both the Western "capitalists" and the Soviets. The Chinese induced the officials of this Afro-Asian meeting to exclude the Soviets on the grounds that the USSR is not an Asian country. In an attempt to save face, the Soviets put out rumors that they had actually been invited, but had refused to attend.

LENIN ON IMPERIALISM

Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the domination of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the partition of all the territories of the globe among the greatest imperialist countries has been completed.

"Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916) in Selected Works, International Publishers, New York, 1943, vol. V, p. 81

Lenin's definition of imperialism, surprising as it may be to some, fits the Communist East and not the Free West. For example, in the definition quoted above -- written significantly before any Communist state existed -- the fourth (last) criterion for the highest stage of imperialism applies directly:

.... in which the partition of all the territories of the globe among the greatest imperialist countries has been completed.

The history of the last almost half century is generally as follows:

The Western Democracies have neither sought nor acquired new territory, have divested themselves of most of their colonies and are granting independence to others as indigenous leaders are prepared to take over the reins of government.

The USSR has, from its inception in 1917, subjugated millions of people (ethnic national minorities among them) and forcibly annexed countless countries (e.g. Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, the Caucasus countries). The Soviets have extended their empire beyond the boundaries and even the dreams of the old Tsarist imperialists.

The People's Republic of China (CPR) has, since its establishment in 1949, followed the same pattern (e.g. subjugated the non-Han peoples, established governments in North Korea and

North Vietnam, annexed Tibet and committed genocide there, invaded India and is now supporting wars against Laos and South Vietnam). The Chinese Communists are intent not only on capturing the tributary countries of the old Middle Kingdom, but on extending their empire far beyond those Asian lands.

And now, the two giants of the Communist world, having first generally agreed to regional spheres of interest, are openly fighting to dominate the Communist forces in the world and such territory as these have or may control.

While the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist Party of China (CCP) have not partitioned the world (Lenin's phrase) between them -- since they are far from controlling it -- they started at an early stage in an attempt to divide it before quarrelling over it.

Lenin defined imperialism largely as an economic phenomenon, but this master of organizational techniques understood all too well the political forces involved. One of the problems in discussing imperialism is in allowing the Communists today to define the problem as purely economic, in not clearly exposing their deceptive economic theory and interpretations, and even in erroneously assuming that they are unaware of the independent political forces involved.

What the Communists are doing is to propagate the outmoded Marx-Engels proposition that society is shaped alone by man's relation to the means of production, that private groups control these means, and that these same capitalists created states to enforce their control. These so-called principles sidestep many of the political dimensions of society and attempt to turn things upside down (as Marx treated Hegel also) by claiming that there is a material substructure which is the sole cause of the political superstructure of society. There are many sources of political power: the CPSU and the CCP are probably the most incisive modern examples of well trained political groups overturning all of the institutions of a society and taking over all of a country's economic instruments. Their intent is to impose their own political system in all countries until they finally subjugate the world.

Bringing Lenin's definition up to date. If one were to be realistic and rewrite Lenin's definition to accord with the character of the world today, it would become clear that the Communists, not the Western Democracies, are imperialists. For example, look closely at capitalism's purported weapons -- "domination of monopolies" and "international trusts." But, attempts to dominate developing countries today are made not by private financial interests (i.e. capitalists and capitalist countries). They are being made by Communists using their own unique organizational weapons, namely: popular fronts (i.e. "domination" of a political party ("monopoly") within countries; and front organizations (e.g. labor, youth, women, veterans, journalists, Afro-Asian complexes) internationally. International fronts (controlled by Communist cadres) are the channels through which the Communists are attempting to harness the political force of the masses throughout the world. Should there be any doubt as to which



"international trusts seek to divide the world" one need turn only to the written statements of those who have created and are using these organizations as tactical weapons. If the Communist doctrinal program for world domination (i.e. Lenin's works) is too theoretical or historical (e.g. Comintern documents), or if the current Communist theoretical publications are too dull and heavy, the CPSU-CCP polemics since 1962 are direct and viciously to the point. In waging open battle for control of the world communist movement, these leaders are outspoken in mutual charges exposing the function of Communist international organizations and their intended use in bringing the world under Soviet or Chinese Communist domination. Each calls upon local Communist cadres in these organizations to resist the false interpretation of doctrine and the big power chauvinism of the other. The CCP, for example, not content to wait for the outcome of their struggle to grasp control of the established international fronts from the CPSU, is attempting to take over all of the Afro-Asian groups and to exclude the Soviets from membership.

Applying Lenin's Economic Criteria. If one follows Lenin's definition of imperialism as an economic phenomenon (which the Communists do in an attempt to characterize the western countries as neo-colonialist, since they can no longer charge political subjugation in the absence of colonies), then the Communist economic organizations and relations should be looked at. The USSR has now established a substantial record for attempting to use economic power to impose political hegemony over other countries. That this has not always been completely successful is less to the point than that it is a major weapon and continues to be used as such. Even more enlightening is what Communists themselves say about the use of economic power. Incriminating charges, for example by Yugoslavia, Albania and the CPR, show the extent of Soviet efforts to assert hegemony over Communist countries. In an attempt to bring them to their knees and to warn others against similar resistance, the USSR withdrew agreed upon aid (technicians, material, credit) and abrogated trade agreements which seriously damaged the economies of these countries. CPSU-CCP polemics show how vitriolic have been the Soviet action and the Chinese reaction to this use of economic agreements as a political weapon within the Communist world. Rumania's objections to CMEA or to any communist "superstate or extrastate bodies" (Rumanian Workers Party statement of 26 April 1964) is another case in which Soviet attempts to dominate through an economic monopoly and an international trust is exposed.

Communist use of economic power in free countries has not been so dramatic or drastic. But it is just as much in evidence and is perhaps more insidious. The countries with which the USSR establishes economic relations are seen to be limited and selected on the basis of certain characteristics. Among these characteristics are: a certain willingness to give at least verbal support to Communist anti-imperialist policies; a more or less critical geographic position; and an apparent vulnerability to Communist pressure and penetration. For example: Sukarno has saddled the Indonesian economy with a debt to the USSR of a billion dollars, primarily for military aid (Lenin's "export of capital"?); -- and is dependent upon the Soviets in pursuing his territorial aspirations; Ben Bella received a large credit for Algeria while voicing support for almost



the whole of CPSU's program against the free world and for national liberation; Nasser, while strongly rejecting Khrushchev's prescription of Arab socialism for the UAR as less nationalism and more international classlessness, accepted a new substantial Soviet credit and joined Khrushchev in condemning neo-colonialism. Burma, Mali, Ghana, and most recently Zanzibar, among others, could be added to the list of those to whom the Soviet Union extends aid ("exports capital"?), and vociferously denies there are any strings attached while extracting political concessions large and small.